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Abstract: 
Countries in the Asia and Pacific region have shown many macroeconomic 
similarities during a period of economic integration. This paper argues that there may 
be one more macroeconomic feature to add to the list: strong statutory tax 
convergence. Using data on the statutory corporate tax rate in 15 countries from 1980 
to 2014, we identify (i) a significant dynamic tax convergence pattern, and (ii) three 
tax convergence clubs. The latter consist of the small tax haven economies of Hong 
Kong and Singapore, the East Asian countries (plus one), and the South and Southeast 
Asian and Oceania countries. These economies, within groups, have been reducing 
the tax gaps with their neighbours over time. 
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1. Introduction 
The growing international exchange of products and factors has contributed to the 
strong integration in the Asia and Pacific region, which includes countries such as 
Australia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. In particular, in 
1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand initiated the 
creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), aiming to achieve a 
single common market by 2015 through gradual economic integration. Regional 
integration would come with some kind of fiscal policy coordination, and in particular, 
tax system coordination. Against this backdrop, this paper is the first to raise the 
question of whether tax policies are converging in the Asia-Pacific region. 
With increasing capital mobility and foreign direct investment (FDI) across country 
borders, as well as the recognition that FDI is an important force for economic growth, 
governments in Asia have extensively engaged in strategic tax policies designed to 
attract footloose firms from abroad. Hence, countries may compete to attract FDI. In a 
recent contribution, Chen et al. (2014) provide a theoretical model based on 
economies of agglomeration that explains tax competition among regions; see also 
Stewart and Webb (2006), Devereux (2012) and Liu (2014). Hence, convergence of 
tax rates may well occur as a result of competition to attract foreign corporations. 
Since the start of the 2008 Great Recession, it has been acknowledged that capital 
inflows may be an important source of credit creation, which may in turn boost 
economic growth, with this having been particularly true before 2008 (Carvalho, 
2014). The rationale behind this is that foreign capital may be used to finance internal 
spending, in particular in booming sectors, such as the housing market in some 
peripheral European countries. Given that foreign capital has clearly been a cheap 
source of funding for local economies, one way that governments can make it easier 
for foreign companies to establish themselves is to soften their tax burdens. FDI may 
have an important impact on the host economy by means of job creation and 
technology spillovers, which may boost aggregate demand. In a recent paper, Cuestas 
and Regis (2013) analysed the effect of capital inflows on real exchange rates, and 
vice versa, in a number of East Asian countries, and found that capital mobility is 
significant, and that movements in competitiveness have an impact on capital inflows. 
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Since taxes can affect final prices, tax policies may affect the competitiveness of a 
country in terms of attracting foreign capital. 
Tax convergence may well be explained by globalisation and economic integration. 
Since 1980, many countries have relaxed their restrictions on capital mobility and 
have tried to integrate themselves into the world economy. Bretschger and Hettich 
(2002) found a negative and significant impact of globalisation on corporate taxes for 
14 OECD countries. This finding is in line with the tax law convergence claimed by 
Avi-Yonah (2010). In the past 30 years, consumption value added tax (VAT) has been 
widely introduced by many countries, gradually replacing direct taxes on corporate 
benefits and labour income. This may have enhanced the corporate tax rate 
harmonisation. 
There is a large literature on tax competition, economic integration and tax regime 
shifts, all of which lead to increasing pressure on tax policy harmonisation and thus 
provides an explanation for the existence of tax convergence (see Velayos et al., 
2008). However, studies on tax convergence itself are surprisingly rare. A few papers 
analyse tax convergence using a macro tax burden or fiscal pressure indicator such as 
tax revenue. Additionally, most focus on European Union (EU) countries, where the 
process of economic integration has accelerated the discussion on fiscal 
harmonisation. For instance, Delgado and Presno (2010) found little evidence of tax 
convergence (1965±2005) in the EU-15, using both the revenue to gross domestic 
product (GDP) ratio and the tax mix ratios as benchmarks. Becker and Elsayyad¶V 
(2009) study, through the introduction of a bilateral similarity index to measure the 
similarity of tax systems conditional on country characteristics, identified a slight 
convergence in OECD tax systems. The main findings from the literature indicate that 
high tax rate countries have cut their taxes the most in previous years, which has led 
tax rates to converge slightly over time. Recently, Apergis and Cooray (2014) showed 
that there was no full convergence of total tax revenues and their composition across 
the Asia-Pacific countries in the period 1990±2012; however, club convergence was 
identified, with three or four clubs identified, depending on the type of revenue 
studied. 
Given the clear path taken by the Asian countries towards a more integrated region, 
fiscal harmonisation is on their agenda. Moreover, according to Bettendorf et al. 
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(2010), for fiscal harmonisation, governments need to contemplate not only tax base 
consolidation, but also rate harmonisation. In this study, the evidence concerning 
corporation tax rate convergence is directly tested using a sample of 15 countries from 
the Asia-Pacific region. Cluster analysis is performed through the application of the 
new methodology of panel convergence testing proposed by Phillip and Sul (2007, 
2009), and beta convergence and sigma convergence are also taken into consideration. 
The results support convergence in tax rates across the Asian and Pacific countries. 
Interestingly, this convergence result may also be related to the race to the bottom 
empirical literature, which has explored the declining trend of corporate income tax 
rates around the world (including the Asia-Pacific region) in studies such as those by 
Slemond (2004), Stewart and Webb (2006) and Devereux et al. (2008). That is, while 
the literature has identified a negative trend in corporate tax, club convergence would 
imply the distribution is concentrated around a number of clusters. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the tax data. Section 
3 reviews the most commonly used concepts of beta and sigma convergence and 
presents the regional tax convergence result. This is followed by the identification of 
convergence clubs within the region, in Section 4. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The data: Statutory tax rates 
In order to assess tax convergence, we need a measure that can be compared across 
countries and over time. However, there is no clear-cut way to summarise DFRXQWU\¶V
complex corporate tax system. Some countries adopt multiple-rate systems, with 
specific rates by sectors, while others may have graduated corporate tax rate 
structures. Three choices are generally considered in the literature: marginal effective 
tax rates, average tax rates and statutory tax rates. Fullerton (1999) was the first to 
develop the approach of assessing effective tax rates, which is a useful way to assess 
the micro-level decisions made by companies. Nonetheless, such estimates are 
project-specific and sensitive to assumptions about economic fundamentals and 
legislation. Moreover, in the Asian and Pacific countries, the data needed to calculate 
this estimate are difficult to collect, making it unavailable for country-level 
comparisons. By far the most commonly adopted measure in cross-country studies is 
the average corporate tax rate, defined as tax revenues over GDP. Criticisms of this 
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measure mainly stem from the fact that an increase in the average corporate tax rate 
may be due to a recession in the business cycle or an increase in the presence of 
organisations instead of an increase in the tax rate. The alternative choice is the 
statutory tax rate, though arguably it may fail to comprehensively analyse the 
corporate tax base, including the inventory allowance system, inflation adjustment 
and depreciation schedules, holidays and availability of credits to investment, as 
summarised in Slemrod (2004). However, the legal tax rate is a highly transparent and 
clear measure of fiscal policy and tax schemes. Thus, we use it in this paper as the 
measure of corporate income taxes. 
In this study, unlike in previous studies, the variable of interest is the statutory tax rate 
rather than the tax revenue, the aim being to use a proxy that is simple to interpret and 
independent of business cycle effects. The main data source is the World Tax 
Database for the period 1980±2003, expanded when necessary with KPMG corporate 
tax rates (1993±DQG.30*¶V&RUSRUDWHDQG,QGirect Tax Rate Survey (1999±
2014). The OECD tax statistics database (1981±2014) is also used for the four OECD 
countries in our sample. The World Tax Database is one of the first attempts to gather 
comparable figures for statutory tax rates for a large number of countries. Two of the 
sources of the original database are KPMG and OECD. Therefore, we select the 
available data for the Asia and Pacific region in 1980±2003 and update the data up to 
2014 from two of the original sources. Summary statistics by country in four different 
years (1980, 1991, 2002 and 2014) can be found in Table 1. 
 
3. Tax convergence 
Alternative concepts of convergence have been developed, such as absolute beta 
convergence, sigma convergence, conditional beta convergence, stochastic 
convergence and club convergence, among others. Of these, absolute beta and sigma 
convergence are more directly related to the original ideas of the convergence 
literature. Also, it is relatively simple to produce graphical representations of them. 
Beta convergence has to do with poor countries growing faster than richer ones, 
depending on their past or initial values (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). In our framework, it is 
given by: 
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 ?ଶ଴ଵସିଵଽ଼଴ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦଵଽ଼଴ ൅ ɂ ,                 (1) 
where ɂ  is the error term. A significant and negative Ⱦ  is indicative of beta 
convergence. Convergence in GDP usually is defined with variables in logs; however, 
our approach is to use the original variable since tax rates are measured in percentages, 
making the economic interpretation of the results straightforward. In Figure 1, 
changes in the tax rates are compared with the initial tax rate. The negative slope of 
the regression line shows the absolute beta convergence of corporate tax rates:  ?ොଶ଴ଵସିଵଽ଼଴ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ଵଽ଼଴ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻ .               (2) 
Standard errors are given in brackets. The beta convergence coefficient is negative 
and significant at 1%. However, as there are only 15 observations the results should 
be interpreted with caution. In this case, tax convergence has been achieved through 
cuts in statutory tax rates: countries with high tax rates converging to a lower tax rate. 
The countries with the highest tax rates in 1980 have cut their taxes the most (e.g., 
China and India), while countries with low tax rates in 1980 (e.g., Hong Kong) have 
barely changed their tax rates. The speed of convergence is around 3.4% per year,1 
while the average annual (negative) change is 1.5%. This suggests that tax rates 
appear more alike at the end of the period, with a rapid rate of convergence. 
Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993) argue that sigma convergence is of more interest 
since it directly examines whether countries are becoming increasingly homogeneous. 
Beta convergence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for sigma convergence, 
as can be seen in Furceri (2005) and Young et al. (2008). Sigma convergence 
indicates that whether the dispersion of the distribution is declining over time. Figure 
2 shows the evolution of the standard deviation of tax rates. The clear negative trend 
indicates sigma convergence during the full period, with a small-scale upturn in the 
last 5±8 years. The standard deviation shrinks by almost half, which is quite an 
interesting evolution in the dynamic behaviour of tax rates. This result also suggests 
that countries are more alike at the end of the period, with similar statutory tax rates. 
In 2007, the average tax rate was 28.3% with a typical deviation in a country of ± 5%. 
                                                 
1
 For completeness, if the tax rates were transformed into logs, the coefficient would still be 
statistically significant and the speed of convergence would be 1.8%. 
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Both figures have decreased from the 1980 figures of 41% (mean) and 10.8% 
(standard deviation). The mean tax rate continues to decrease until 2014, ending up at 
24.3%, while the standard deviation increases to 5.5%. 
 
4. Cluster analysis and tax convergence 
The beta and sigma convergence analysis is complemented with a study of 
convergence clubs, which makes better use of the heterogeneity in behaviour across 
countries. According to Phillips and Sul (2007), dynamics need to be modelled under 
the assumption of heterogeneity. Their theoretical approach justifies the use of 
statistical methods that provide the ability to identify clusters or clubs of convergence, 
and are not based upon unit root and co-integration analysis. 
 
4.1. Logt convergence: The logt test 
In cases where convergence has been rejected, some have followed a clustering 
strategy to identify convergence clubs that may explain the overall non-convergence, 
exploring the heterogeneity in the inter-temporal behaviour within the sample. That is, 
the above definitions of convergence may be inadequate when the economic 
fundamentals are different across the countries analysed. In the case of tax rates, the 
fundamentals behind the long-run differences across clusters could be related to the 
structural characteristics of the FRXQWULHV¶ tax systems. 
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) argue that a panel can be decomposed into two main 
components: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ሼݕଵ௧ǡ ݕଶ௧ǡ ǥ ǡ ݕே௧ሽ ൌ ߤ௧ߜ௜௧,                      (3) 
namely, the common component ߤ௧  and the idiosyncratic component ߜ௜௧ . The 
fundamental idea behind the procedure is to test whether ߜ௜௧ converges to a common 
value, ߜ. In order to test this hypothesis, these authors propose the analysis of the 
following semi-parametric equation: ߜ௜௧ ൌ ߜ௜ ൅ ఙ೔క೔೟ሾ௟௢௚ሺ௧ሻሿ௧ഀ ,                           (4) 
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where Ɍ୧୲ ?ሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ across ݅ but is weakly dependent over t and ɐ୧ ൐  ?. According 
to the formulation in Equation (4), the key parameters for convergence are Ƚ and ߜ௜. 
Convergence of Ɂ୧୲ to Ɂ happens when Ƚ ൒  ?, so ߜ௜௧ ՜ ߜ௜ when ݐ ՜  ? , and at 
the same time Ɂ୧ ՜ Ɂ for all ݅. The joint hypothesis ܪ଴ǣ Ɂ୧ ൌ Ɂܽ݊݀Ƚ ൒  ? can be 
empirically tested by means of the following auxiliary regression: ሺߪ௛ଵଶ ߪ௛௧ଶ ? ሻെ  ?ሾሺݐሻሿ ൌ ܿ ൅ ܾ ሺݐሻ ൅ ݑ௧,              (5) 
where ߪ௛௧ଶ ൌ ଵே  ? ሺ݄௜௧ െ  ?ሻଶே௜ୀଵ                        (6) 
is the squared average transition differential, and ݄௜௧ ൌ ߜ௜௧ ?ܰ ? ߜ௜௧ே௜ୀଵ ൌ ௜ܻ௧ ?ܰ ? ௜ܻ௧ே௜ୀଵ ሺ ?ሻ 
is the relative transition path. Under the null hypothesis of convergence, ߪ௛௧ଶ ՜  ?. 
From Equation (5) one can estimate Ƚ as Ƚෝ ൌ ෠ܾȀ ?. For this estimate of Ƚ to be 
valid, it is required that Ɂ୧ ൌ Ɂ since ෠ܾ is estimated to be constant across countries.2 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of convergence (ܪ଴ǣ Ɂ୧ ൌ Ɂܽ݊݀Ƚ ൒  ?) is a one-sided test 
based on the t-statistic of ෠ܾ, which focuses on the evolution of the transition paths 
over time compared to the common growth component. This is a time series 
regression where a transformation of the cross-sectional variance of ݄௜௧ is regressed 
against ሺݐሻ, whose coefficient and t-statistic, which we refer to later as the 
logt-statistic, are the values of interest. If, for all economies in a convergence club, ݄௜௧ ՜  ? as time evolves, then the cross-sectional variance of ݄௜௧ converges to zero 
and there is convergence. Note that, since the statistic is based on the variance of the 
logarithm of the variable of interest, this test is more related to sigma than beta 
convergence. 
                                                 
2
 In addition, Phillips and Sul (2009) claim that depending on the estimated values of ෠ܾ, one can 
assess whether the processes present absolute convergence, i.e., level convergence, or conditional 
convergence, i.e., convergence in growth rates. Hence, if ෠ܾ ൒  ? the processes converge in levels, 
whereas if  ? ൑ ෠ܾ ൏  ? the processes present conditional convergence. That is, stronger evidence in 
favour of convergence is required if we are to conclude that there is level convergence. However, note 
that because this is the analysis of a variable that can only assume values between 0 and 100, long-run 
growth may not be realistic. Within this framework, convergence in growth rates would eventually lead 
to either overall or cluster convergence in levels. 
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The alternative hypothesis includes two general cases: divergence and club 
convergence. If the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected, it may be because 
there is no convergence (Ƚ ൏  ?). Alternatively, it may be that Ƚ ൒  ? but not all Ɂ୧ 
converge to a single Ɂ for all countries. Here, the variance of ݄௜௧ converges to a 
constant rather than zero, which is consistent with having two or more convergence 
clubs. In other words, there are multiple equilibrium values, and different groups of 
countries converge to different values. Identifying the composition of these groups 
would help to test whether there is within-group convergence. 
Phillips and Sul (2007) developed a four-step clustering algorithm whereby 
convergence clubs are identified by endogenised groupings. The cluster procedure is 
based on the logt test from Equation (5), performed iteratively over country 
subsamples. In Step 1, countries are sorted in descending order according to the last 
period of analysis of the variable of interest, namely the tax rate. In Step 2, a core of k 
countries of a convergence club is formed, by taking the first two countries in Step 1, 
computing the logt-statistic and, if the statistic is larger than -1.65, adding the 
remaining countries to the core one by one in descending order and computing the 
new logt-statistic until it is less than-1.65. In Step 3, the remaining countries are 
added one at a time and the logt-statistic is computed to check whether they can be 
added to the convergence club. In Step 4, the logt-statistic is computed for the 
remaining countries to check whether they form a convergence club (i.e., 
logt-statistic > -1.65). Otherwise, Steps 1±3 are repeated to check whether there is 
more than one club. The critical value at 5% is -1.65 because the statistic is 
distributed as N(0,1) and the alternative is one-sided. See Phillips and Sul (2007) for 
further details. 
 
4.2. Clusters in the Asia and Pacific region 
The overall picture in Section 3 shows strong indications of convergence in tax rates. 
Although sigma convergence has not been rejected, this is not inconsistent with the 
existence of convergence clubs and, if they do exist, it would be of interest to identify 
them. The general trend is downwards in terms of the dispersion of statutory tax rates; 
however, this can happen due to different reasons, and clustering can be used to 
explore heterogeneity patterns across convergence clubs that occur at the same time as 
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homogeneity is increasing within the clubs. The cluster composition can help us to 
understand some of this heterogeneity. 
The results of our analysis are displayed in Table 2, in which the variable of interest 
( ௜ܻ௧) is defined as the statutory tax rate. The last column shows a logt-statistic of 
-4.085, according to which the null of overall convergence in the full sample of 15 
countries is rejected. This result contrasts with our findings in Section 3 in favour of 
convergence. However, the absence of overall logt convergence may still be 
consistent with beta and sigma convergence if there is evidence of club convergence. 
Sigma convergence, for example, does not distinguish between overall convergence 
(long-run variance of 0, i.e., ߪ௒௧ଶ ՜  ?) and club convergence (converging from above 
to a constant, i.e., ߪ௒௧ଶ ՜ ߪ௒ଶ ൐  ?). This implies that the clustering algorithm should 
be applied recursively until all clubs have been identified. 
Interestingly, the application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) cluster algorithm reveals 
that there are three clusters: convergence Club A, with nine countries; Club B with 
four countries and Club C, a small cluster of two countries (see Column 3 for their 
composition). The groups are organised according to their average tax rate in the last 
three years (Column 2). Column 5 contains the logt test results, which show that we 
cannot reject the null of convergence in any of these three cases. This means that there 
is evidence of tax convergence within each cluster. 
Column 4 shows the t-statistic of sigma convergence, for which the null of no log 
time trend in the variance of tax rates (in logs) implies no convergence. This test is 
based on the similarity of the concepts of logt convergence and sigma convergence. 
According to Equation (5), logt convergence examines whether there is a time trend in 
the time variance of the transition parameter ݄௜௧. This is the variance of the variable 
of interest ௜ܻ௧ normalised by its cross-sectional mean in each period. Other than the 
normalisation to the cross-sectional sample average, logt convergence appears to be 
similar to the sigma convergence test, with a particular form of time trend. 
Since all t-statistics reject the null of no convergence at 1%, there is evidence of 
sigma convergence within the clusters. In Figure 3, within-cluster sigma convergence 
confirms convergence within these clubs is even stronger, if anything, than for the full 
sample. The general convergence trend of the full sample is quite similar to that of the 
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largest convergence club, Club A with nine countries, but within Club A, convergence 
seems to have accelerated since the early 1990s. Club convergence among the Club B 
countries has been even more rapid than in Club A, while Club C¶VFRQYHUJHQFH has 
been the most rapid. 
The same test of sigma convergence for the overall sample provides a t-statistic of 
-5.93 (not reported in Table 2), which is consistent with the sigma convergence in 
Figure 2, although it seems to contradict the rejection of overall logt convergence. 
This may be explained by the term  ?ሾ݈݋݃ሺݐሻሿ on the left-hand side of Equation 
(5), which has not been included in this sigma convergence test. This difference 
between the two tests may be very important in practice. According to Phillips and 
Sul (2007), this is a penalty function that improves the performance of the test. It 
helps the test to distinguish between overall convergence (not rejection of the null) 
and club convergence (rejection). Therefore, the sigma convergence test does not 
distinguish between sigma and cluster convergence, while the logt test does. 
Figures 4 and 5 present the evolution of the relative transition functions ݄௜௧. The 
analysis of ݄௜௧ provides an opportunity to explore the heterogeneity of the sample in 
more detail. Convergence would imply increasing homogeneity of ݄௜௧ and the curves 
should concentrate around 1 (which is, by construction, the average value of ݄௜௧). In 
these graphs the convergence paths are clearly shown and they confirm the results in 
Table 2. Figure 4 depicts the transition curves aggregated at the cluster level, and 
shows no sign of convergence. Clusters A and B are more similar to each other than 
to Cluster C. However, the trend shows that, overall, the clusters are becoming more 
distinctive, if anything. 
The three graphs in Figure 5 show the dynamics within the clusters. The convergence 
is very rapid within Cluster C, and more rapid than in the other two clubs. One 
interesting point is that cluster convergence for the other two clubs seems to have 
been faster before 2008 and the Great Recession, than afterwards. Clusters A and B 
show an increase in dispersion after 2008, which may have been motivated by the 
financial crisis. The general negative trend of the statutory rate continues, driven by 
countries with low rates, in each cluster. In Cluster A, Thailand and Fiji reduced their 
rates from 28% and 30% in 2011 to 20% by 2013, while Taiwan had made an 8% tax 
cut even earlier, in 2010 (to 17%). Taiwan and Thailand, with the lowest tax rates for 
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most of the period under study in each cluster, could be considered the front runners 
of tax cuts. 
To formally test convergence excluding the effect of the financial crisis, we ran the 
Phillips and Sul (2007) algorithm for a subsample up until 2007, leaving the years of 
the crisis out of the analysis. The results, which are not reported here for the sake of 
brevity, point to the existence of only two clusters, with Hong Kong and Singapore in 
one cluster and the rest of the countries in the second cluster. The Phillips and Sul 
(2009) test of overall convergence is rejected, meaning that the two clusters cannot be 
merged. It is interesting that Clusters A and B from the full sample period have 
merged. 
Finally, to check the robustness of our analysis, we applied Robinson¶V (1995) 
multivariate test for fractional integration, based on a semi-parametric approach, 
which allowed us to both estimate the differencing parameters and test for the 
hypothesis of their equality among countries. This analysis is based on fractional 
integration methods. A fractionally integrated process is a process whose order of 
integration is any non-integer number between 0 and 1, hence breaking the dichotomy 
of traditional tests for the order of integration of variables I(d), which classify 
variables as I(1) or I(0). We considered this complementary analysis as a robustness 
check for the following reasons: it allows us to analyse how (dis)similar the 
persistence of shocks to the target variable is. It also allows us to test, in a more 
flexible way, the order of integration of the variable, as the order of integration is not 
an integer. Finally, we can test the null of equal orders of integration, which in 
essence is a test for similar responses to shocks. Hence, the Robinson (1995) approach, 
since it is applied within a panel framework, can provide us with valuable information 
about the similarity of the dynamics and mean reversion among FRXQWULHV¶WD[UDWHV 
We analyse the autoregressive, fractionally integrated, moving average ARFIMA(p, d, 
0) of the form: 
 
TtyLL tt
d
p ,...1,)1)((   ) H ,                (8) 
 
where )(Lp)  is a polynomial of order p, with all zeros of )(Lp)  outside the unit 
circle, and tH  a white noise process. Table 3 displays the results of the estimations. 
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The first point to notice is that the estimated parameters are well above 0.5, which is 
indicative of high persistence, meaning that the steady state has not yet been achieved. 
Second, the test for equality of the differencing parameter confirms the results 
obtained in Table 2; i.e., the speed of adjustment is similar within clusters. 
With the clusters identified and club convergence confirmed, it is possible to test for 
convergence among the clusters. This is important, since Phillips and Sul (2009) 
recognised that their procedure/algorithm (Phillips and Sul, 2007) may overestimate 
the number of clusters. Hence, they proposed a test for overall convergence, which 
allows us to test whether or not the clusters converge among themselves. This is the 
same test as was performed within the clusters separately, but now two clusters are 
grouped at the same time. If the logt test supports the hypothesis of overall 
convergence, this suggests that the countries in the two clusters are also converging 
over time. Therefore, this test is usually considered to be a convergence club merging 
test, from which a larger cluster may emerge in the long run. 
In Column 6 of Table 2, two logt-statistics of convergence, of Clusters A with B and 
B with C, are reported. The overall logt test (Column 7) and the cluster transition 
curves (Figure 4) support the fact that the clusters do not converge among themselves; 
however, the results imply that Clusters A and B may be converging,3 while Cluster 
C is clearly not. This suggests that in the long run, tax rates may become 
homogeneous in the region, with the possible exception of the tax haven economies, 
which have a distinctive dynamic from the rest. 
Finally, the composition of the clubs is also interesting, especially when compared 
with a large international sample. Table 4 presents the statutory tax rate of 111 
countries for which data is available in 2013, including the 15 from our sample. The 
extended sample increases the international comparability of our results. Overall, our 
sample of 15 countries is well scattered, with a low presence at the lower end, if any. 
The average statutory tax rate during the last three years for Cluster C is 16.8%, quite 
low compared to the rest of our sample (6.2 percentage points, below COXE %¶V
average) and at the lower end of international standards (see Table 4). Comparative 
                                                 
3
 At this point, note that the convergence of Clusters A and B would be consistent with the analysis of 
the period 1980±2007 described earlier. 
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studies of tax incentives in Hong Kong and Singapore, the two members of Club C, 
are very popular (see Lam, 2000, and Phua Lye Huat and Halkyard, 2012). Their tax 
structures aim to attract foreign investment. Although they have followed different 
approaches to stimulate business (Hong Kong followed simple and stable rules, while 
Singapore followed discretionary intervention) they have been very successful at 
attracting foreign capital, competing with each other for this. 
Hong Kong and Singapore are special cases since they are tax haven countries. 
Although there is more than one definition of tax haven, a common reference is 
OECD (1998). Hines and Rice (1994) identified Hong Kong and Singapore as two4 
of the µbig seven¶ tax havens in the early 1990s. More recently (2013), the Tax Justice 
Network (www.taxjustice.net/) has ranked Hong Kong and Singapore in the tax haven 
top five, according to the 2013 Financial Secrecy Index. The taxation policies in tax 
havens behave differently than in non-tax havens, so this must be recognised in our 
analysis. Low (or nil) corporate tax is a condition, but not the essential element, of a 
tax haven. Hong Kong and Singapore provide confidential financial and legal services 
to non-residents and corporations, preventing effective information exchange with 
other countries. 
The average tax rate of Cluster B is 23%, which is close to the international average. 
According to Table 4, the global average is around 23.2%, while the OECD (33 
countries) and EU (27 countries) averages are 23.4% and 21.3%, respectively. China, 
South Korea and Taiwan are the countries of East Asia, a region with important 
economic and cultural ties. The East Asian countries5, together with Malaysia6, make 
up convergence Club B, which suggests that the tax convergence of East Asia within 
the Asia and Pacific region has been important, but that tax convergence within the 
East Asian countries has been even stronger and in fact happened earlier. 
                                                 
4
 $OWKRXJKµELJ¶UHIHUVWRSRSXODWLRQLHJUHDWHUWKDQRQHPLOOLRQLQKDELWDQWV+LQHVDQG5LFH
estimate the Big-7 account for 40% of assets, equity and net income in tax havens of US corporations. 
Hines and Rice (1994) do no list any other country of our sample as a tax haven. 
5
 Japan is also commonly designated to the East Asian region. However, in our analysis, Japan does 
not seem to behave similarly to the other East Asian countries. This may be because the corporate tax 
system in Japan is more complex than in the rest of the region. 
6
 It should be noted that China has a strong influence in Malaysia, with 20±25% of the population 
having Chinese ancestors, especially from the Canton region. China and Malaysia have had strong 
commercial links for a long time. However, it may be argued that the cultural and commercial ties that 
Malaysia has with countries such as Indonesia or Singapore are stronger. 
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It is more difficult to find the connection among the countries in Group A, the largest 
cluster, since it is a mix of South and Southeast Asian countries and countries from 
Oceania. The 2012±2014 average tax rate of 27.6% is the highest among the three 
clusters, and comparable to moderate-to-high corporate tax countries, such as Italy 
(27.5%), Norway (28%) and South Africa (28%). However, the convergence process 
here is almost as strong as in Clubs B and C. Figure 3 shows that the standard 
deviations of the three groups in 2008 are quite similar, while there is a slight increase 
at the end of the period for Clusters A and B. 
These results are similar to some of the findings of Wang (2007), who studied cluster 
convergence of tax burden and GDP growth. His sample includes our four East Asian 
countries (China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and another 20 OECD countries. 
China, South Korea and Taiwan form a convergence cluster, while Japan belongs to a 
different cluster, which also includes New Zealand and Australia (with other six 
OECD countries). These results are consistent with some of our findings: the first 
cluster is very similar to our Cluster B while Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
belong to Cluster A. However, comparability is limited by the difference in the 
clustering algorithm and the exclusion of other Asian countries. 
On the other hand, Apergis and Cooray (2014) find different results using the same 
methodology as we do for a sample of 11+ Asian and Pacific countries. Tax revenue 
is disaggregated into five main sub-categories, making use of the revenue-to-GDP 
ratio. There is lack of overall convergence in total revenues, including two divergent 
countries: China and Japan. When looking at personal income, profit and capital gains 
taxes, they found three clusters but the overlap with our clusters is limited. However, 
the main limitation of Apergis and Cooray (2014) is the short time span. Based on the 
1990±2012 period, their logt-statistics are based on only 23 time periods. 
 
5. Conclusions 
With the increasing degree of economic integration in the Asia and Pacific region, the 
convergence of the fiscal systems across these countries warrants a thorough analysis. 
This paper examines the statutory corporate tax rate in the 15 Asia-Pacific countries 
within the period 1980±2014 and shows that convergence is prevalent in the region. In 
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contrast to most previous convergence test results for taxes, the statutory rates are de 
facto harmonised within the Asia and Pacific region, with its different degrees of 
national fiscal autonomy, economic structures and political preferences. 
Two strands of the literature may help to explain the existence of tax convergence. 
First, the tax competition literature has proposed that negative trends may be 
explained by the strategic behaviour of governments when competing for the location 
of corporations. In a recent study, Chen et al. (2014), using an IV-GMM strategy to 
estimate the national-level tax reaction function, found evidence in favour of tax 
competition in 14 Asia-Pacific countries, of the sort that would explain the negative 
slopes in Figures 1 and 2. These results, along with ours, suggest that tax competition 
among regions indeed produces a Nash equilibrium. 
Second, tax convergence may be part of globalisation and economic integration in the 
Asia-Pacific region. In this case, tax convergence could be explained as part of a 
cooperative game in which governments have recognised the importance of 
transnational enterprises in an integrated world. This would promote more 
homogeneous tax setting, with countries with relatively high corporate taxes cutting 
their rates. Avi-Yonah (2010) identified two general trends that partially explain 
corporate tax convergence: the generalisation of VAT replacing corporate taxes, and 
the cross-country integration of corporate taxes (e.g., the elimination of double 
taxation), which may have created incentives to homogenise corporate tax regimes. 
Jogarajan (2012) presented a discussion of the network of bilateral tax treaties that has 
resulted from cooperation in the region. 
The sigma and beta convergence might well be driven by increasing capital mobility 
as measured by flows of financial capital, flows of FDI and the relaxation of 
restrictions on capital and financial flows in the integration process. More importantly, 
using the panel convergence proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007), we find that the 
cross-country variance in the statutory corporate tax rates not only declines across 
time, but converges to three convergence clubs. This is consistent with the existence 
of more than one Nash equilibrium, as in the theoretical work of Taugourdeau and 
Ziad (2011). In other words, the speed of tax rate adjustment is shown to be similar 
within clusters, but different across clusters, in the transitional dynamics before the 
steady state is reached. This is also confirmed using the multivariate test for fractional 
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integration, which captures the tendency to converge. In sum, we contribute to the 
convergence literature by modelling both transitional dynamics and the long-run 
behaviour in a consistent framework. 
The policy implications from this study are twofold. On one hand, we argue that 
taxation, among other factors such as labour markets and supply chains, is not, and 
should not be, an impediment to greater integration and economic growth across the 
Asia and Pacific countries, at least within the convergence clubs. This study allows 
policymakers to implement measures to promote greater integration between 
countries with divergent tax systems to prevent a race to the bottom due to tax 
harmonisation. On the other hand, the downward tax convergence trend led by 
countries with relatively high corporate taxes cutting their rates to attract footloose 
capital raises concerns regarding tax policy autonomy as well as welfare concerns 
when the tax burdens are shifted from mobile to less mobile factors. 
A caveat in this paper is that, although affirmative patterns of the statutory corporate 
taxation are confirmed, it does not suffice to identify the determinates, whether these 
are the domestic factors or regional competitive pressures, that shape the convergence 
pattern within and between the clusters. However, the latter question has been 
addressed in the literature, primarily in cross-country studies of tax reaction functions 
that predict similar interdependent behaviour in statutory corporate tax rate setting 
among countries. Future empirical attempts could tackle the interaction between tax 
convergence and convergence in other economic, political and institutional 
characteristics that help to better understand both the clustering and the diversity 
within this region. 
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Figure 1: Tax Rate Convergence: Beta Convergence 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Tax Rate Convergence: Sigma Convergence (full sample) 
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Figure 3: Tax Rate Convergence: Sigma Convergence (within clusters) 
 
Note: The solid line (full sample) is the same as in Figure 2. Sigma convergence is much stronger 
within clusters than in the full sample, as the three lines converge to zero more rapidly. 
Figure 4: Relative Transition Curves (across clusters) 
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Figure 5: Relative Transition Curves (within clusters) 
 
Notes: Each plot shows the transition parameter within each cluster separately. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics by country over time 
 
 
1980 1991 2002 2014 
 
Mean 
St 
Dev 
      
Australia 46.0 39.0 30.0 30.0 
 
36.3 7.8 
China 55.2 40.0 30.0 25.0 
 
37.6 13.3 
Fiji 37.5 37.5 32.0 20.0 
 
31.8 8.3 
Hong Kong 17.0 16.5 16.0 16.5 
 
16.5 0.4 
India 60.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 
 
41.3 13.1 
Indonesia 45.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 
 
33.8 8.5 
Japan 40.0 37.5 30.0 25.5 
 
33.3 6.7 
Korea, Rep 30.0 34.0 27.0 22.0 
 
28.3 5.1 
Malaysia 40.0 35.0 28.0 25.0 
 
32.0 6.8 
New Zealand 45.0 33.0 33.0 28.0 
 
34.8 7.2 
Pakistan 55.0 50.0 45.0 34.0 
 
46.0 9.0 
Philippines 35.0 35.0 32.0 30.0 
 
33.0 2.4 
Singapore 40.0 31.0 24.5 17.0 
 
28.1 9.8 
Taiwan 35.0 25.0 25.0 17.0 
 
25.5 7.4 
Thailand 35.0 30.0 30.0 20.0 
 
28.8 6.3 
        Mean 41.0 34.6 29.8 24.3 
   St Dev 10.8 7.5 6.2 5.5 
    
Cluster A
.
6
.
8
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
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1980 1990 2000 2010
AUS FIJ IND IDN JPN NZD PAK PHI THA
Cluster B
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1.
4
1980 1990 2000 2010
CHN KOR MYS TWN
Cluster C
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.
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1
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2
1.
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HKG SIN
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Table 2: Club convergence 
 
  
Sigma 
 
ሺݐሻ 
estimator 
and 
(t-ratio) 
 
[1] 
Tax rate 
mean 
[2] 
Countries 
 
[3] 
converg. 
test 
[4] 
Cluster 
converg. 
[5] 
Cluster 
merging 
[6] 
Full sample 
converg. 
[7] 
Cluster A 27.6% 
Australia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand 
(-3.74)*** 
0.291 
 
 (1.191) -0.155  
 
Cluster B 23% China, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan (-5.35)*** 
0.315 (-0.874) -0.394  
(0.622) -0.201 (-4.085)*** 
Cluster C 16.8% Hong Kong, Singapore (-3.25)*** 
2.889 (-2.141)*** 
 (4.924 ) 
 
 Notes: Columns have been numbered from [1] to [7]. In the second column, the club average tax rate across the last three years can be found. The last 
three columns contain the logt convergence test: (within) cluster convergence, cluster merging and overall convergence. In the logt test, a one-sided test 
with critical values of -2.33, -1.65 and -1.28 (at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively), the null hypothesis implies convergence. Column 4 
tests for within-cluster sigma convergence, where rejection of the null implies convergence. Sigma convergence is tested through the t-stat of ෠ܾ in the 
following linear regression: ሺߪ௒௧ଶ ߪ௒ଵଶ ? ሻൌ ܿ ൅ ܾ ሺݐሻ ൅ ݑ௧, mimicking the logt-statistic (however, note that this is the variance of ௜ܻ௧  rather than ݄௜௧  and the ሾ݈݋݃ሺݐሻሿ correction term is not included), where a significant negative trend implies convergence. All values in parentheses are 
t-statistics with Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors, of Newey-West type (truncation parameter of 3). ***, **, * 
stand for 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. 
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Table 3: Estimated d parameters for each cluster 
 
Cluster A: 
Test for equality of d coefficients: F(8,207) = 0.53196; Prob > F = 0.8317 
 
Cluster B: 
Country Estimated d t-statistic 
China 0.742 6.032 
South Korea 0.865 7.029 
Malaysia 0.772 6.273 
Taiwan 0.615 4.997 
Test for equality of d coefficients: F(3,92) = 0.70401; Prob > F = 0.5520 
 
Cluster C: 
Country Estimated d t-statistic 
Hong Kong 0.609 4.770 
Singapore 0.785 6.147 
Test for equality of d coefficients: F(1,46) = 0.9483; Prob > F = 0.3352 
 
  
Country Estimated d t-statistic 
Australia 0.707 5.596 
Fiji 0.709 5.611 
India 0.692 5.477 
Indonesia 0.692 5.167 
Japan 0.827 6.545 
New Zealand 0.630 4.990 
Pakistan 0.631 4.996 
Philippines 0.783 6.197 
Thailand 0.511 4.045 
 26 
 
Table 4: Corporate tax, statutory rates in 2013 (%) 
Country Rate Country Rate Country Rate Country Rate 
    
 
   
Utd Arab Em 55.0 Uganda 30.0 AP-Club B 23.0 Singapore 17.0 
Angola 35.0 Dominican R 29.0 Slovak Rep 23.0 Slovenia 17.0 
Argentina 35.0 New Zealand 28.0 UK 23.0 Taiwan 17.0 
Honduras 35.0 Norway 28.0 Botswana 22.0 AP-Club B 16.8 
Pakistan 35.0 South Africa 28.0 Ecuador 22.0 Hong Kong 16.5 
Sudan 35.0 Sri Lanka 28.0 South Korea 22.0 Romania 16.0 
United States 35.0 AP-Club A 27.6 Sweden 22.0 Canada 15.0 
Zambia 35.0 Bangladesh 27.5 Syria 22.0 Georgia 15.0 
France 34.4 Italy 27.5 Estonia 21.0 Germany 15.0 
Brazil 34.0 Greece 26.0 Luxembourg 21.0 Kuwait 15.0 
Venezuela 34.0 Zimbabwe 25.8 Afghanistan 20.0 Latvia 15.0 
Belgium 33.0 Japan 25.5 Armenia 20.0 Lithuania 15.0 
Namibia 33.0 Austria 25.0 Cambodia 20.0 Mauritius 15.0 
Mozambique 32.0 Bolivia 25.0 Croatia 20.0 Serbia 15.0 
Guatemala 31.0 China 25.0 Fiji 20.0 Jordan 14.0 
Australia 30.0 Colombia 25.0 Kazakhstan 20.0 Cyprus 12.5 
Costa Rica 30.0 Denmark 25.0 Libya 20.0 Ireland 12.5 
El Salvador 30.0 Egypt 25.0 Russia 20.0 Macao 12.0 
India 30.0 Indonesia 25.0 Saudi Arabia 20.0 Oman 12.0 
Kenya 30.0 Israel 25.0 Thailand 20.0 Albania 10.0 
Malawi 30.0 Jamaica 25.0 Turkey 20.0 Bosnia & Herz 10.0 
Mexico 30.0 Malaysia 25.0 Yemen 20.0 Bulgaria 10.0 
Nigeria 30.0 Netherlands 25.0 Czech Rep 19.0 Macedonia 10.0 
Papua New G 30.0 Panama 25.0 Hungary 19.0 Paraguay 10.0 
Peru 30.0 Portugal 25.0 Poland 19.0 Qatar 10.0 
Philippines 30.0 Trinidad & T 25.0 Ukraine 19.0 Montenegro 9.0 
Spain 30.0 Uruguay 25.0 Belarus 18.0 Switzerland 8.5 
Tanzania 30.0 Vietnam 25.0 Chile 17.0 Bahrain 0.0 
Tunisia 30.0 Finland 24.5     
      
  Notes: The sample has 111 countries, all of which have a population of half a million or more. 
Countries in bold feature in our analysis. The average tax rates of the three convergence clubs from 
Table 2 have also been included. 
Sources: OECD and KPMG. 
 
 
